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Long-Term Industry Reversals 
 
Abstract 
This study investigates whether, how and why industry performance can drive long-term return 
reversals. Using data from the UK, we find that firms in losing industries significantly 
outperform those in winning industries over the subsequent five years. These industry reversals 
remain strong and persistent after controlling for stock momentum, industry momentum, 
seasonal effects and traditional risk factors. We find a strong influence of past industry 
performance on stock return reversals. Our results also show that past industry performance is 
the driving force behind long-term reversals. Specifically, we find that industry components 
drive stock reversals, while past stock performance does not explain industry reversals. Further 
analysis suggests that industry reversals are present in both good and bad states of the economy 
and are stronger in industries with high valuation uncertainty. This implies that industry 
reversals are more likely to be a result of mispricing.    
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1. Introduction 
DeBondt and Thaler (1985) show that loser stocks over the past three to five years outperform 
winners by 25% in the next three years. Many subsequent studies also report evidence of long-
term reversals in major international equity markets.1 Despite this evidence, the causes of these 
reversals are highly controversial in the literature. Prominent behavioural theories suggest that 
reversals occur due to investors’ behavioural biases in forecasting firm growth (DeBondt and 
Thaler, 1987; Daniel et al., 1998; Barberis et al., 1998; Hong and Stein, 1999). However, Klein 
(2001) and George and Hwang (2007) contend that reversals reflect investors’ rational 
reactions to a delay in the payment of capital gains taxes. Rational asset pricing models also 
suggest that reversals represent compensation for risk (Fama and French, 1993, 1996; Zhang, 
2005; Liu, 2006).  
 This study contributes to this ongoing debate by investigating whether, how and why 
industry performance can drive long-term return reversals. As firms in the same industry share 
similar fundamentals and are affected by common shocks, arising from shifts in demand and 
supply for their products, industry components can cause the returns of these firms to comove 
(e.g. Welch, 2004; Mackay and Philips, 2005). The rational view of asset pricing suggests that 
this comovement represents industry-specific risk. Theoretical asset pricing models 
demonstrate that a firm’s risk and return can be a function of its industry characteristics (e.g. 
Berk et al., 1999; Calson et al., 2004, 2014; Peress, 2010; Bustamante, 2015).2 Consistent with 
this theoretical prediction, several empirical studies document that industry components can 
explain asset pricing regularities (e.g. Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999; Hou and Robinson, 
2006; Hameed and Mian, 2015). Kogan (2001), Zhang (2005) and Hou et al. (2015) show that 
firms have greater investment adjustment costs in downturn industries and the potential risk 
associated with having irreversible investments in place can cause higher returns for firms 
operating in poorly performing industries than for those in well performing industries. The 
models of Fama and French (1997) and Cohen et al. (2003) also indicate that poor past 
performance represents distress risk and firms in losing industries are, therefore, expected to 
offer higher returns to their shareholders for bearing industry distress risk.  
Market frictions and investors’ irrational behaviour can also induce industry 
components in stock returns. Barberis et al. (2005) and Peng and Xiong (2006) argue that 
                                                          
1 E.g. Chou et al. (2007) in Japan, Clare and Thomas (1995) in the UK and George and Hwang (2007) in the US. 
2 Fama and French (1997) find that neither the Sharp-Linter-Black capital asset pricing model (CAPM) nor their 
three-factor model can precisely estimate industry costs of equity. Lewellen et al. (2010) show that macro-
economic (e.g. consumption, consumption-to-wealth, and investment-to-growth) based asset pricing models fail 
to explain cross-sectional returns for industry portfolios. 
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investors allocate funds at a category rather than individual stock level. If these category 
investors are noise traders with correlated sentiment, their coordinated demand may cause 
excess comovement in the returns of stocks in the same category. Barberis et al. (2005) also 
argue that investors trade only a subset of securities. When these investors’ risk aversion, 
sentiment, or liquidity needs change, they alter their exposure to the securities in their habitat, 
thereby causing comovement beyond fundamentals. If an industry represents a category or a 
habitat, the coordinated demand of noise traders at the industry level can generate industry 
components that are unrelated to firm fundamentals.  
The behavioural models proposed by Daniel et al. (1998), Barberis et al. (1998) and 
Hong and Stein (1999) suggest that these industry components may drive long-term return 
reversals. In Daniel et al.’s model, investors exhibit overconfidence and self-attribution biases. 
The degree of investors’ overconfidence and self-attribution may vary over time and across 
industries, causing mispricing and subsequent reversals. For example, Moskowitz and 
Grinblatt (1999) argue that the difficulty in assessing the value of new or changing industries 
promotes overconfidence among investors who are related to these industries. They also argue 
that investors’ conservatism bias can reduce the speed at which investors update their priors 
about new and changing industries. In Barberis et al.’s (1998) model, investors exhibit 
representativeness bias, causing them to become too optimistic (pessimistic) about firms with 
a sequence of good (bad) news. Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) argue that if investors focus 
more on industry than firm specific news, the representativeness bias can lead them to 
extrapolate performance too far from the industry as a whole, yielding long-term reversals. 
Finally, several studies show that analysts and institutional investors have more industry- and 
market-wide information than firm-specific information (e.g. Piotroski and Roulstone, 2004; 
Irvine and Pointiff, 2009; Peress, 2010). As analysts and institutional investors usually pay 
more attention to industry leaders, the prices of these leaders will reflect market- and industry-
wide news more quickly than those of their followers. Similarly, industries with more analysts 
and institutional holdings are shown to incorporate market-wide news faster than other 
industries (e.g. Hong et al., 2007). When traders seek to exploit sluggish price adjustments to 
industry- or market-wide information, they can create excess industry momentum and 
subsequent industry reversals may happen as prices revert back to their equilibrium levels (e.g. 
Hong and Stein, 1999).  
Given the above arguments, it is surprising that little attention is given to the industry 
reversals and their role in explaining stock reversals. This study fills the gap. Using stocks 
listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE), we find significant long-term industry reversals 
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in the UK market. Specifically, we show that stocks in losing industries outperform those in 
winning industries over the subsequent five years after controlling for stock momentum, 
industry momentum, seasonal patterns and traditional risk factors. We also show that industry 
reversals are much stronger than stock reversals. In particular, we find that industry reversals 
are present in all calendar months, in neutral (neither winner nor loser) stocks and after 
adjusting for past stock performance. However, stock reversals exhibit strong seasonal patterns, 
are non-existent in neutral (neither winning nor losing) industries and disappear when adjusting 
for past industry performance. This evidence supports the prediction that industry components 
are the main driving force behind long-term return reversals.  
In the subsequent analysis, we also investigate whether the long-term industry reversals 
are consistent with rational explanations or are a result of mispricing. To this end, we 
investigate whether stock and industry reversals survive after stringent risk adjustments. By 
using both the Fama and French (1993, 2015) three- and five-factor model3, we find that stock 
reversals completely disappear, while industry reversals remain positive and significant, albeit 
weak in the five-factor model. Since industry reversals are not fully explained by risk factors, 
it is plausible that mispricing is also at play. To shed further light on this issue, we compare the 
performance of the industry contrarian strategies in different states of the economy. Lakonishok 
et al. (1994) argue that, if loser stocks are fundamentally riskier than winner stocks, then 
contrarian strategies should be profitable only in good states, as the high marginal utility of 
wealth in bad states makes loser stocks unattractive to risk-averse investors. However, if 
industry reversals represent a form of market inefficiency, one would expect them to be more 
pronounced in industries with high information uncertainty (see, e.g., Hirshleifer et al., 2013). 
We find that the profits of industry contrarian strategies exist in both good and bad states of 
the economy and are higher in industries with less competition, high accruals, high 
idiosyncratic volatility and low analyst coverage. 4  These findings suggest that industry 
reversals are more likely to represent mispricing rather than compensation for risk.   
This study contributes to the literature in many ways. First, to the best of our 
knowledge, we are the first to study long-term industry reversals and their impact on the well-
documented long-term stock reversals. Our study is related to the work of Moskowitz and 
                                                          
3 Note that it is yet to be established whether the profitability and investment factors in Fama and French (2015) 
reflect rational risk or mispricing. See Hou et al. (2015) for further discussions.   
4 Dhaliwal et al. (2011) use accruals as a proxy for information opacity, Hong et al. (2000) use firm size as a 
proxy for investors’ attention, and Kumar (2009) uses idiosyncratic volatility as a proxy for valuation 
uncertainty. 
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Grinblatt (1999), who document strong industry components in the short-term stock 
momentum anomaly. However, while several studies argue that short-term momentum and 
long-term reversals are related (Hong and Stein, 1998; Jegadeesh and Titman, 2001), others 
show that they are two independent phenomena (George and Hwang, 2004)5. Thus, whether 
industry reversals have an impact on stock reversals remains an open empirical question. In 
this study, we document the presence of strong industry reversals, which fully subsume the 
stock reversals. This finding has important implications for the asset pricing literature. 
Specifically, while several early studies show that contemporaneous industry returns have little 
impact on stock returns (e.g. Fama and French, 1997; Heston and Rouwenhorst, 1994; Griffin 
and Karolyi, 1998), we find that past industry performance strongly affects future stock returns. 
Second, we investigate whether the importance of industry returns in the conditional asset 
pricing is consistent with rational expectations or is better explained by behavioural biases. We 
find that industry reversals are more consistent with behavioural explanations and represent a 
challenge to the rational asset pricing models. Third, we evaluate the ability of the Fama and 
French (2015) five-factor model to explain anomalies outside the US. Using data from the UK, 
we find that the five-factor model fully explains the stock return reversals, but its ability to 
explain industry reversals is relatively limited. Finally, the institutional setting of the UK 
market provides a unique opportunity to test the role of taxes in long-term return reversals. 
George and Hwang (2007) show that stock reversals in the US come exclusively in January. 
Since the UK tax year end is 5 April, investigating stock reversals in the month of April helps 
us understand whether the strong January reversals in the US are caused by tax loss selling or 
are merely the turn-of-the-year effect. Consistent with the tax loss selling argument, we find 
that stock reversals in the UK are particularly strong in April. However, the finding that 
industry reversals are not confined to the months of January or April is inconsistent with the 
tax loss selling hypothesis.    
 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data and 
the methodology. Section 3 provides summary statistics. Section 4 provides empirical results, 
and Section 5 concludes. 
2. Data, variables and methodology 
2.1 Sample data 
                                                          
5 George and Hwang (2004, 2007) show that the momentum captured by the nearness of a stock’s price to its 
52-week high does not reverse in the long term.  
6 
 
Our sample consists of all stocks listed on the LSE from January 1970 to December 2011. The 
stock monthly and daily return series, market capitalisations, international industry 
classification (ICB) and firm characteristics are extracted from Thomson Reuters Datastream. 
We only include common stock, filtering on the data type and company name (e.g. Griffin et 
al., 2010; Ince and Porter, 2006)6. The final sample includes a total of 6,216 stocks with 
995,717 firm-month observations. This sample is considerably larger than those used in prior 
UK studies7. Since Datastream reports the stock return index (RI) to the nearest hundredth, 
stock returns computed from the RI measure may round very small returns to zero values. To 
avoid potential rounding errors, we set a monthly return to be missing if the RI is less than or 
equal to 0.10. If a stock is delisted and no delisting reason is given in DataStream, we assign 
the last trading month return as -50%. Shumway (1997) finds that -30% is the average return 
for delisted firms traded over the counter. Setting a delisting return lower than that of Shumway 
would cause a downward bias in the magnitude of long-term return reversals.  
We use ICB system to classify the sample stocks into 20 super-sectors. 8  This 
classification strikes a balance between having enough stocks in an industry and grouping 
stocks with homogeneous business environments together. The average number of stocks for 
each super-sector in each month is provided in Table 1. The table shows that stocks are not 
evenly distributed across super-sectors, ranging from 364 in industrial goods and services to 6 
in the automobile and parts industry. Because the automobile and parts and telecommunications 
industries include fewer than 20 stocks, we use the remaining 18 industries to construct long-
term winning and losing industry portfolios.9  
 
 
2.2 Variable construction 
(i) Stock’s five-year past performance measure (stock_5yret): This variable measures 
a stock’s return over the past 60-month period, 60
60
t t
t
P P
P


 , plus the return from 
                                                          
6 Details on the screening procedures are provided in Appendix A1. 
7 While Clare and Thomas (1995) employ a random sample of 1,000 UK stocks, Wu and Li (2011) use 1,745 
UK stocks that are constituents of the FTSE All Share Index. 
8 The ICB system is a commonly used industry classification outside the US markets. It uses four tiers of 
classifications, namely 10 industries, 20 super-sectors, 41 sectors, and 114 sub-sectors. Thomson Reuters 
Datastream provides only static information on ICB. It is possible that firms’ industry classifications change 
over time. However, since the super-sectors are reasonably broad, these changes probably do not occur 
frequently.  
9 Our results are not sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of the two industries among the benchmark 
industries. Further results are available upon request.   
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reinvesting dividends. Following DeBondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) and George and 
Hwang (2007), we set the 5-year winner (loser) dummy to unity if a stock is ranked 
in the top (bottom) 30% of all stocks in terms of the five-year performance measure, 
and zero otherwise. 
(ii) Long-term winning and losing industries: We define an industry’s monthly return 
index (RI) as the value-weighted monthly returns of stocks in that industry. Industry 
five-year past performance (ind_5yret) is measured as 60
60
t t
t
RI RI
RI


 . The long-term 
winning (losing) industries are defined as the three industries with the highest 
(lowest) ind_5yret (e.g. Moskowiz and Grinblatt, 1999). We also set the 5-year 
winning (losing) Ind dummy to unity if a stock belongs to winning (losing) 
industries, and zero otherwise.   
(iii) Stock momentum: We use the price relative to the 52-week high to control for stock 
momentum. Following George and Hwang (2004), we define 52wkhWinner 
(52wkhLoser) as a dummy variable that equals one if i
i
P
high
 is ranked among the 
top (bottom) 30% of all sample stocks in month t, and zero otherwise. Here, 
iP  is 
the price of stock i at the end of month t and 
ihigh is the highest month-end price 
of stock i during the 12-month period that ends on the last day of month t.10  
(iv) Industry momentum: Following Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999), we select the 
three best and worst performing industries according to each industry’s value-
weighted past 12-month returns (i.e. ind_12m_ret= 12
12
t t
t
RI RI
RI


 ). We then set the 
IndMomWinner (IndMomLoser) dummy to unity if a stock belongs to the three best 
(worst) performing industries, and zero otherwise.  
(v) Neutral portfolios: We use two dummy variables to denote neutral stocks and 
neutral industries. stockNeutral  is equal to one if a stock belongs to neither the five-
year winner nor loser portfolio, and zero otherwise. Similarly, industryNeutral  is equal 
to one if a stock belongs to neither winning nor losing industries, and zero 
otherwise. We interact stockNeutral  with 5-year winning Ind. and then with 5-year 
losing Ind. to capture the return pattern of winning and losing industries with neutral 
                                                          
10 George and Hwang (2004) find that the 52-week high (52wkh) measure is superior to the 12-month past 
performance measure (Jegdeesh and Titiman, 1993) and the industry 12-month past performance measure 
(Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999) in capturing short-term momentum.  
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stock performance, respectively. We also interact industryNeutral  with 5-year winner 
and then with 5-year loser to identify the return pattern of winner and loser stocks 
with neutral industry performance, respectively. The four interaction terms evaluate 
the relative strength of stock and industry reversals. Specifically, we examine 
whether stock reversals exist in neutral industries and whether industry reversals 
are present among neutral stocks.   
(vi) Excess industry and stock portfolios: We redefine five-year winner and loser stocks 
in terms of excess industry returns. An excess industry return is calculated as a 
stock’s five-year return minus the five-year value-weighted return of the industry 
that the stock belongs to. All stocks are then ranked by their industry excess returns 
in a given month. A dummy variable 5year winnerExcess (5year loserExcess) is equal 
to one if a stock is in the top (bottom) 30% in terms of its excess industry return, 
and zero otherwise. This approach to identifying winner and loser stocks takes into 
account past industry performance. We also redefine winning and losing industries 
in terms of excess stock returns. All stocks are first placed into quintile portfolios 
according to their past five-year performance (stock_5yret). An individual stock’s 
excess return is computed as the stock’s five-year return minus the value-weighted 
five-year return of the quintile portfolio to which the stock belongs. The excess 
returns on individual stocks are then averaged within each industry. The winning 
and losing industries are defined as the three industries with the highest (lowest) 
average excess stock returns. We set the 5year winning IndExcess (5year losing 
IndExcess) dummy to unity if the stock belongs to the winning (losing) industries, and 
zero otherwise. The four dummies described above can evaluate which of the two 
types of performance is the driving force behind long-term reversals. Specifically, 
if past industry performance drives long-term reversals, industry reversals should 
not be wiped out after adjusting for past stock performance. Alternatively, if past 
stock performance is responsible for the reversals, stock reversals should not 
disappear after adjusting for past industry performance. 
 
2.3 Methodology             
Following George and Hwang (2004, 2007, 2010) and Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004), we 
use the Fama and MacBeth (1973) style regression to measure and compare returns to different 
long-term investment strategies. This approach has the advantage of isolating the performance 
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of a particular investment strategy from other factors that could affect returns. It also allows us 
to assess the performance of the long-term investment strategies across different investment 
horizons.    
If an investor forms portfolios of winners and losers every month and holds these 
portfolios for the next T months, the return earned in a given month t is the equal-weighted 
average of the returns to T portfolios, each formed in one of the past T months t-j (for j=1 to 
T).11 Thus, the contribution of the portfolio formed in month t-j to the month-t return can be 
estimated by the following cross-sectional regression:  
 
0 1 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 1 4 , 5 ,
6 , 7 , 8 ,
9 , 10 , 11
52 52
5
5 5
it jt jt i t jt i t jt i t jt i t j jt i t j
jt i t j jt i t j jt i t j
jt i t j jt i t j
R b b R b size b BM b wkhWinner b wkhLoser
b IndMomWinner b IndMomLoser b yearWinner
b yearLoser b yearwinningInd b
    
  
 
     
  
   ,5jt i t j ijtyearlosingInd e 
     (1)                
where Rit is the return to stock i in month t;  sizei,t-1 is the log of market capitalisation; Ri,t-1  is 
the previous month’s return; BMi,t-1 is the past month’s book-to-market ratio; and the remaining 
eight dummy variables are as defined earlier. The variable sizei,t-1, Ri,t-1 and BMi,t-1 are 
expressed as deviations from their cross-sectional means and are included in the regression to 
control for the size effect, the bid-ask bounce and the book-to-market effect, respectively12.  
The intercept 0 jtb  is the return to the risk-neutral portfolio that was formed in month 
t-j and has hedged out the effects of average size, bid-ask bounce, book-to-market, momentum 
and long-term winners and losers in predicting returns. The sum 8ojt jtb b  is the month t return 
to a portfolio formed in month t-j by longing five-year winner stocks in order to hedge out all 
other effects. Consequently, 8 jtb  can be interpreted as the return in excess of 0 jtb , achieved 
by taking a long position in five-year winners j months ago. Similar interpretations hold for the 
coefficients on the remaining variables (see Fama, 1976).  
                                                          
11 The portfolio formation and testing technique used here is in the same spirit as Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), 
which avoids test statistics that are based on overlapping returns. This technique makes use of the fact that ranking 
on the past 60 months and holding for the next 60 months produces a time series of monthly returns in which each 
month’s return is a combination of 60 ranking strategies. For example, a January 2000 reversal strategy return is 
1/60 determined by winners and losers from November 1994 to December 1999, 1/60 by rankings from October 
1994 to November 1999, 1/60 by rankings from September 1994 to October 1999, and so on until the last 1/60 is 
determined by rankings from February 1990 to January 1995. The return estimation procedure used here also 
takes account of other factors in predicting returns.     
12 For robustness purposes, we also include the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure as an additional control in the 
Fama-MacBeth regression. Our results for industry contrarian performance remain quantitatively unchanged, 
albeit stock contrarian performance becomes relatively weak. These results are available upon request.    
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The coefficients 10 jtb  and 11 jtb  represent the equally weighted excess returns of stocks 
that belong to the winning and losing industries, respectively. 11 10jt jtb b  can be interpreted as 
long-term industry contrarian performance from a zero investment strategy that is formed by 
longing the winning industry portfolio and shorting the losing industry portfolio (see, e.g. 
Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999). Similarly, 9 8jt jtb b  represents long-term stock contrarian 
performance resulting from a zero investment strategy of longing loser stocks and shorting 
winner stocks. The comparison of the performance of these two zero investment strategies is 
the main interest of this study.    
The total month-t returns involve portfolios formed over the prior 60 months (see 
George and Hwang, 2007). For example, the total month-t returns to five-year winner and loser 
stocks can be calculated as 
60
8 8
1
1
60
t jt
j
S b

  and 
60
9 9
1
1
60
t jt
j
S b

  , where the individual 
coefficients are calculated from separate cross-sectional regressions for each j=1,…, 60. 
Dividing by 60 rescales the sums to be monthly returns. We then estimate the time-series means 
of the month-by-month estimates of these sums and their Newey-West (1987) adjusted t-
statistics. We also obtain risk-adjusted returns for each portfolio by employing the Fama-
French (1993, 2015) three- and five-factor models. Specifically, the time series of each 
coefficient (e.g. 8 9 10, ,t t tS S S  and 11tS ) is regressed on the contemporaneous Fama and French 
factor realizations to hedge out the factor exposure. The intercept (alpha) of the time-series 
regression is a risk-adjusted return to a particular portfolio. We also regress ( 9 8t tS S  ) and       
( 11 10t tS S ) on the Fama-French factors to obtain risk-adjusted contrarian returns.  
 
3.  Summary statistics  
Table 1 reports the basic characteristics of the 20 industry portfolios. The average percentage 
of total market capitalisation, the five-year raw return, and the five-year excess market return 
are the time-series means of the cross-sectional industry averages in each month. The five-year 
raw returns are calculated from the five-year value-weighted industry return indices, and the 
five-year market excess returns are calculated from the five-year industry raw returns minus 
the five-year FTSE All Share market index returns. In terms of the relative market 
capitalisations, the banking sector has the highest market share (of around 20%), while the 
automobiles and parts industry has the lowest number of firms and the lowest market share (of 
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only 0.79%). The average five-year raw and the market excess returns vary considerably across 
industries, ranging from 0.73% (telecommunications) to -0.48% (others).    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 and Table 2 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 2 reports the time-series means of the cross-sectional correlations between the 
long-term reversal variables (see the variables in Section 2.2). The positive correlation between 
the five-year winner (loser) stocks and the winning (losing) industries indicates that the 
portfolios formed on past industry performance share some similarities with those formed on 
past stock performance. The positive correlation between 5year winning IndExcess (5year losing 
IndExcess) and 5-year winner (loser) suggests these similarities are maintained after adjusting 
for past stock performance. However, the negative correlation between 5-year winnerExcess (5-
year loserExcess) and 5-year winning (losing) Ind implies that the similarities disappear after 
adjusting for past industry performance. These findings highlight the importance of taking 
industry past performance into consideration when defining long-term winners and losers.  
4. Results 
4.1 Identifying long-term industry reversals 
We first estimate Eq.(1) to investigate the presence of long-term industry reversals after 
controlling for other variables that could affect returns. George and Hwang (2007) and 
Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004) find that the outperformance of losers over winners is 
significantly weaker outside January. They conclude that long-term reversals are driven by tax 
loss selling at the tax year end. Since the UK tax year end is 5 April, we report the results 
separately with January and April included and with these two months excluded. This 
separation allows us to account for both the turn-of-the-year and the tax loss selling effects in 
the reversals. Table 3 reports the results for the entire five-year period (columns (11) and (12)) 
and the five individual holding periods (columns (1) to (10)). 
 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The key variables in Table 3 are 5year winning Ind., 5year losing Ind., 5-year winner 
and 5-year loser. In column (11), losing industries and loser stocks experience significant 
positive returns of 0.27% (t-statistic=3.86) and 0.11% (t-statistic=2.07) per month, 
respectively, over the five-year period. Column (12) shows that the return on loser stocks loses 
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its significance, whereas the return on losing industries remains significantly positive (0.30% 
per month), after the exclusion of January and April. This indicates that the significantly 
positive returns on loser stocks come exclusively from January and April, while stocks in losing 
industries experience positive returns across all calendar months.   
Columns (1) to (10) show the results for the individual holding periods. The returns 
on losing industries are significantly positive from the second to the fifth year, regardless of 
whether January and April are included. Loser stocks also have significant positive returns of 
0.11% per month in the second year, 0.12% per month in the third year and 0.16% per month 
in the fourth year. However, columns (4), (6) and (8) show that the returns on loser stocks are 
not statistically significant outside January and April. This finding suggests that the returns on 
loser stocks have strong seasonal patterns, consistent with George and Hwang (2007) and 
Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004).   
In the last three rows, we evaluate stock and industry contrarian performance.  Over 
the five-year period, losing industries significantly outperform winning industries by 0.29% 
per month (column (11)). This outperformance remains significant after the exclusion of 
January and April (column (12)). The industry contrarian spread is statistically significant from 
the second to the fifth year. Column (11) also suggests that the return on loser stocks is 
significantly higher (0.12% per month) than that of winner stocks. However, this return 
difference becomes insignificant when January and April are excluded. Thus, the 
outperformance of loser stocks over winner stocks is confined to January and April, while 
stocks in losing industries have persistently and significantly higher returns than those in 
winning industries across all months. In terms of economic significance, our results suggest 
that the industry contrarian spread is at least two times greater than the stock contrarian spread 
(e.g. 0.29% against 0.12% in column (12)). We also find that losing industries are the main 
contributor to the industry contrarian spread, consistent with the limits to arbitrage argument 
(see, e.g., Baker and Wurgler, 2006; Stambaugh et al., 2012).13 
The institutional setting of the UK market provides us with a unique opportunity to 
test the role of taxes in explaining long-term return reversals. Unlike that in the US, the UK tax 
year ends on 5 April. The calendar month of April allows us to test the hypothesis that tax loss 
selling is fully responsible for loser stock reversals (e.g. George and Hwang, 2007; Klein, 
                                                          
13 See Section 4.5.4 for further discussion. 
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1999). 14 Lakonishok et al. (1991), Sias and Starks (1997) and Ng and Wang (2004) argue that, 
when the calendar year end is approaching, institutional investors “dress” up their portfolios 
by selling stocks with poor past performance in order to impress their clients with their stock-
picking skills.15 The selling pressure depresses the prices of loser stocks in December. When 
the pressure eases in January, the prices revert back to equilibrium and losers will have higher 
returns. Thus, if this “window dressing” is exclusive to the calendar year end, returns in April 
are more likely to provide a clean test of the tax loss selling hypothesis. We regress the 
contrarian spreads on January and April dummy variables. In untabulated results, the January 
and April dummies are positively and significantly associated with the stock contrarian spread, 
but none of these dummies can explain the industry contrarian spread.16 These findings imply 
that stock reversals can be attributed, at least partly, to tax loss selling or the turn-of-the-year, 
but industry reversals are independent of these effects.  
The remaining variables in Table 3 are included as controls in Eq.(1). The significantly 
negative coefficient on , 1i tR   is consistent with the month-by-month return reversals discovered 
by Jegadeesh (1990) and Lehmann (1990). The lagged book-to-market ratio exhibits a positive 
relationship with stock returns. The stock momentum effect measured by the price relative to 
the 52-week high (George and Hwang, 2004) is much stronger than the industry momentum 
effect (Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999).17      
4.2 Comparisons between industry and stock reversals  
In this section, we evaluate the relative strength of stock and industry reversals. We first search 
for industry reversals among neutral (neither loser nor winner) stocks. Then, we examine 
whether stock reversals exist in stocks with neutral industry performance. The results are 
reported in Table 4, without control variables for the sake of brevity.  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 The two interactions 5stockNeutral yearWinningInd and 5stockNeutral yearLosingInd  are used 
to identify neutral stocks within winning and losing industries. Panel A shows that neutral 
                                                          
14 The tax loss selling hypothesis states that investors seek to reduce their taxes by realising losses at the tax year 
end, thereby depressing stock prices. Stock prices revert back to their equilibrium levels in the first month of the 
new tax year, causing higher returns.  
15 The window dressing effect also affects short-term momentum, as momentum profits are significantly lower 
in January than other calendar months (e.g. Jagadeesh and Titman, 1993; Sias and Starks, 1997).  
16 These results are available upon request.  
17 We also use past 12-month returns to identify momentum winners and losers in Eq.(1). Our main results of 
long-term industry reversals remain unchanged. These results are available upon request.    
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stocks within losing industries have significantly positive returns over the five-year period and 
across the last four holding periods. However, the returns on neutral stocks within winning 
industries are not significant, except for the fifth year (column 5), where the return is negative 
(-0.22% per month) and weakly significant (t-stat =-1.77). This lack of significance is in line 
with our earlier results that losing industries are the main source of industry reversals. The last 
two rows in Panel A show the presence of industry contrarian performance in stocks with 
neutral performance. Specifically, neural stocks in losing industries outperform their 
counterparts in winning industries by 0.29% per month over the 5-year period. In the five 
individual holding periods, the industry contrarian spreads are significantly positive from the 
third to the fifth year (columns (2) to (5)). These findings suggest that industry reversals are 
not confined to stocks with extreme past performance.  
Panel B in Table 4 provides the results on whether stock contrarian performance exists 
in stocks with neutral industry performance. Column (6) shows that in industries with neutral 
performance, winner and loser stocks do not exhibit significant returns over the 5-year period. 
The returns on winner and loser stocks are also not significant in the individual holding periods, 
except in the fourth year. The last two rows show that in industries with neutral performance, 
the return to a zero-investment strategy of longing loser stocks and shorting winner stocks is 
not significant for both the 5-year period and the individual holding periods. In contrast to the 
results in Panel A, this evidence implies that extreme performance of stocks from neutral 
industries does not generate significant contrarian profits.  
4.3 Adjusting for past performance  
While the previous section focuses on the relative strength of stock and industry reversals, this 
section investigates whether past stock or past industry performance is the main driving force 
behind long-term reversals. Specifically, we adjust stock and industry reversals for past 
industry and past stock performance, respectively, to identify which type of reversal survives 
the adjustment.  
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
We first investigate whether stock reversals exist after accounting for past industry 
performance. Recall that the dummy variable 5 year winner Excess  (5 year loser Excess) is set to 
unity for 30% of stocks with highest (lowest) industry-adjusted returns. We refer to these 
dummies as excess industry portfolios and the returns on these portfolios are shown in Panel 
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A of Table 5. Column (6) shows that the return to the loser excess industry portfolio over the 
five-year period is not significant. This portfolio’s return is only significantly positive (0.15% 
per month) in the fourth year (column (4)). The last two rows in Panel A provide much stronger 
evidence that past industry performance drives stock reversals. The contrarian returns between 
the two excess industry portfolios are not significant. The disappearance of stock reversals after 
adjusting for past industry performance implies that industry components are the main source 
of contrarian profits.    
 Our previous results suggest that stock reversals disappear after adjusting for the 
industry effect. Here, we investigate whether the reverse is true. If industry reversals exist and 
are independent of stock reversals, then industry reversals should not disappear after adjusting 
for past stock performance. The two dummy variables 5year winning Ind Excess and 5year losing 
IndExcess are specifically designed to account for the impact of past stock performance on 
industry reversals. We refer to these two dummies as excess stock portfolios. The returns on 
these portfolios are reported in Panel B.   
Column (6) shows that, over the five-year period, the losing industry excess stock 
portfolio has a significant positive return of 0.16%. This return is smaller than that in Table 4 
(i.e. 0.27%), suggesting that past stock performance only plays a partial role in the reversals 
for losing industries. The returns on the losing industry excess stock portfolio are also 
significantly positive in the third and the fifth year. The last two rows in Panel B show that the 
contrarian return between the two industry excess stock portfolios is significantly positive over 
the five-year period as well as in the second and fifth years. However, the significance level is 
slightly lower than that reported in Table 4.  
In untabulated results, we also investigate whether the outperformance of losing over 
winning industries is a within-industry effect. We rank stocks in each industry on their past 5-
year performance and define the 30% highest (lowest) performing stocks as the within-industry 
winners (losers). We find that the contrarian performance of buying within-industry losers and 
selling within-industry winners is not significant, implying that long-term industry reversals 
are not a within-industry phenomenon. 
In summary, this section shows that past industry performance is the driving force 
behind long-term reversals and these reversals are not a within-industry phenomenon. 
 
4.5 Are long-term industry reversals driven by risk or mispricing? 
4.5.1 Risk-adjusted returns 
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This section examines whether stock and industry reversals are attributable to risk exposures. 
Each coefficient in the Fama-MacBeth regressions (Eq.(1)) is a time-series average of sums 
(e.g. 
7tS  and 8tS  in Section 2.3) of monthly raw returns to a particular portfolio strategy. We 
first estimate the risk-adjusted return on a particular strategy by running a time-series 
regression of the strategy’s sums on the Fama-French (1993) factor realizations.18 We then 
report the intercepts (risk-adjusted returns) for the strategy in Table 6. 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
Insert Table 6 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Panel A shows that neither winner nor loser stocks have significant returns over the 
five-year period. The economic magnitude of the loser stocks’ reversals is negligible (only 
0.05% per month with a t-statistic of 0.86) (see column (6)). The stock contrarian performance 
is also insignificant in the five individual holding periods. However, the returns on losing 
industries and the industry contrarian performance remain positive and significant. Thus, 
although the cross-sectional analysis in Table 4 shows the co-existence of stock and industry 
reversals, only industry reversals remain significant after the Fama-French three-factor risk 
adjustments.19  
Recent asset pricing studies (e.g. Novy-Marx, 2013; Fama and French, 2006, 2008; 
Titman et al., 2004) show that firm fundamentals, beyond those in the Fama and French (1996) 
model, predict stock returns. Building upon the discounted cash flow model, two additional 
factors, namely investment and profitability, are introduced to explain cross-sectional stock 
returns (Fama and French, 2015; Hou et al, 2015). To re-evaluate contrarian profits, we use the 
                                                          
18 We are grateful to Gregory et al. (2013) for providing the UK Fama-French factors on their website,  
http://business-school.exeter.ac.uk/research/areas/centres/xfi/research/famafrench/files/ 
19 Our risk adjustments are the same as the procedure of Fama and French (1996). We first estimate the portfolios’ 
returns based on Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions, in which we use all sample stocks (not just winners or losers) 
and are able to hedge out the effect of size, momentum (e.g. from both stocks and industries), and bid-ask bounce 
(or monthly reversals) to isolate monthly returns attributable only to whether a stock belongs to stock- or industry-
past performance portfolios. This first procedure ensures that the second one, which assesses the significance of 
risk-adjusted returns to the portfolios of interest, produces powerful tests. To further justify the risk adjustment 
procedure, we follow George and Hwang (2007) and regress the intercepts (e.g. 


60
1
00
60
1
j
jtt bS ) in Eq(1) on 
the Fama-French three-factor model. The intercepts from these Fama and French regressions are interpreted as 
the risk-adjusted returns to the neutral portfolios (i.e. portfolios that hedge out the bid-ask bounce, size, book-to-
market, momentum and long-term returns for winner-loser stocks and winning and losing industries).  The 
intercepts of the Fama and French regressions are insignificant across all investment horizons, suggesting that the 
Fama and French factors do a good job explaining the returns to neutral portfolios. This evidence confirms that 
the risk adjustment procedure used in this study is well specified. 
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Fama and French five-factor model (Fama and French, 2015) to adjust contrarian returns. Panel 
B provides the results. 
The results show that the returns to both loser and winner stocks over the five-year 
period are not significant. Loser stocks have a significantly positive return only in the fourth 
year (column (4)). The stock contrarian returns are statistically insignificant, except in columns 
(4) and (5).20 The five-factor adjusted returns of loser and winner stocks are almost the same 
as those of the three-factor model (Panel A). The returns on stocks from losing industries 
remain significantly positive both over the five-year period and across the last three individual 
holding periods. The last two rows show that the industry contrarian profits over the five-year 
period are positive (0.19% per month) and significant at the 10% level. The contrarian profits 
are also significant in three out of the five individual holding periods, albeit their magnitude is 
slightly smaller than those reported in the case of the three-factor model.   
In untabulated results, we find that the loading on the value factor for the five-year 
industry contrarian spread is positive, while those on the size and market factors are negative 
in both the three- and five-factor models. This implies that, relative to a neutral portfolio, the 
industry contrarian portfolio has low market risk and tends to be heavily weighted towards big 
firms (which makes sense because large firms are the main contributors to industry 
performance) and value stocks (as losing industries’  market value has decreased and book-to-
market is large). In the five-factor model, the loadings on the investment and profitability 
factors are positive and negative, respectively. This suggests that industry contrarian profits 
come mainly from firms with low profitability (poor earnings may lead to poor performance) 
and those with fewer investment opportunities (firms in losing industries may find it difficult 
to expand their business). These findings suggest that industry contrarian returns are related to 
firm fundamentals.21 
However, does the above evidence mean that industry reversals are a risk premium? 
We argue that this may not necessarily be the case. First, even though one third of industry-
contrarian performance disappears (0.27% vs. 0.19% per month) after controlling for the Fama 
and French five factors, the returns on losing industries remain significantly positive over the 
five-year period and the contrarian performance continues to be significant in some of the 
                                                          
20 The statistical significance of the returns in columns (4) and (5) disappears when January and April are 
excluded. 
21 We also undertake an event study approach to investigate whether time-varying betas and factor loadings can 
explain the positive returns to losing industries (e.g. Ball and Kothari, 1989). Generally, we find that the 
loadings on the value and investment factors have significantly increased in the post-event period. However, 
even after controlling for the changes in the loadings, stocks in losing industries still have significantly positive 
abnormal returns. These results are available upon request.  
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individual holding periods. This means that the mispricing explanation cannot be ruled out. 
Second, Fama and French (2015) note that, as investment and profitability are two elements in 
the discounted cash flow model, the return prediction is the same whether the price is rational 
or irrational. Therefore, the loadings on the investment and profitability factors cannot be 
interpreted directly as risk exposures. Hou et al. (2015, p. 34) made a similar argument in 
stating that “… we wish to emphasize that the q-factor model is silent about the debate between 
rational asset pricing and mispricing. This interpretation is somewhat weaker than the risk 
factors interpretation per Fama and French (1993, 1996).”  
4.5.2 Sharpe ratio analysis 
The reduction of industry reversals in the five-factor model would be consistent with the risk-
based explanation, if the five-factor model were a rational asset pricing model. However, the 
debate on whether the five-factor model captures risk or mispricing is still ongoing. 
Balakrishna et al. (2010) report that the level of profits after controlling for the unexpected 
change in earnings predicts stock returns. Hirshleifer et al. (2011) provide a theoretical model 
in which profitability predicts returns because of investors’ imperfect rationality. In the mean-
variance framework, MacKinlay (1995) argues that risk-based explanations of asset pricing 
anomalies are bounded by the plausibility of the (squared) Sharpe ratio of the tangency 
portfolio that they imply. As such, the mean-variance efficient combination of the factors 
should have a Sharpe ratio greater than or equal to the maximum Sharpe ratio from anomalies. 
Table 7 reports Sharpe ratios for the three-factor model, the five-factor model, and the long-
short contrarian portfolios. The monthly Sharpe ratio for each individual factor is calculated as 
the mean factor return divided by its standard deviation. Following MacKinlay (1995), we also 
estimate the maximum Sharpe ratio achievable from a given factor model as 1' f f fV 
 , where 
f  is the vector of mean factor returns and fV  is the variance-covariance matrix of the factor 
returns.  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Panel A shows that the value and investment factors in the five-factor model have the 
highest Sharpe ratios of 0.10 and 0.25, respectively. The Sharpe ratio of the five-year industry 
contrarian performance is 0.13, which is greater than that of the MKT, SMB and HML in the 
three-factor model. However, the Sharpe ratio of the five-year stock contrarian performance is 
nearly the same as the HML factor (0.10). Panel B shows that the three-factor model produces 
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a maximum Sharpe ratio (0.15) that is lower than that of the industry contrarian performance 
(0.25), but greater than that of the stock contrarian performance (0.13). The tangency portfolio 
implied by the three-factor model encompasses the maximum risk-reward trade-off generated 
by the stock contrarian performance, which is consistent with the risk-based explanation. In 
contrast, the risk-return relationship in the three-factor model suggests that the industry 
contrarian performance is likely to be a mispricing effect. The Sharpe ratios associated with 
the stock and industry contrarian performance in the three-factor model are significant at the 
5% level or better.22 For the five-factor model, the maximum achievable Sharpe ratio is 0.29, 
which is greater than the Sharpe ratio associated with the industry contrarian performance and 
the three-factor model. Consistent with the previous results, the five-factor model is possibly 
more effective in explaining industry contrarian performance than its three-factor counterpart. 
However, the profitability and investment factors in the five-factor model do not necessarily 
represent risk (Fama and French, 2015; Hou et al., 2015). This is because comovement of 
stocks with similar profitability or investment opportunities does not contradict the mispricing 
effect. For instance, if investors have similar bias in processing earnings information, as 
modelled by Hirshleifer et al. (2011), returns on stocks with similar profitability will also 
comove. Hence, investors’ imperfect rationality and firm fundamentals can jointly generate the 
predictive power of profitability for returns. Furthermore, MacKinlay (1995) argues that the 
maximum Sharpe ratio for the three-factor model is too high to be consistent with rational asset 
pricing. We show that the maximum Sharpe ratio of the five-factor model (0.298) is even 
higher. This implies that the five-factor model may capture some elements of mispricing in 
stock returns and therefore we cannot fully rule out the mispricing effect in the industry 
contrarian performance. 23 
 
 4.5.3 State of the economy  
Our previous results show that although fundamental-related risks have explained some portion 
of industry contrarian performance, a considerable proportion of the positive returns on losing 
                                                          
22 Under the null hypothesis that the factor risk premiums are jointly equal to zero, [(T-N)/N]SSR is distributed 
as a central F(N, T-N), where N is the number of portfolios, T is the number of time-series observations and SSR 
is the squared Sharpe ratio (for details, see MacKinlay (1995) and Brennan et al. (1998)).  
23The maximum Sharpe ratios for the three- and four-factor models are 0.21 and 0.41 in US markets, as reported 
by Hou et al. (2015). The four-factor model is based on the q-theory without the value factor. Hou et al. (2015) 
argue that the value effect is captured by the profitability and investment factors. We find that the value factor 
plays an important role in explaining industry-contrarian performance. Without the value factor in the five-factor 
model, industry-contrarian profits are significantly positive at the 5% level. Hou et al. (2015) argue that the 
maximum Sharpe ratio for their four-factor model is not too high (0.41) compared with the maximum Sharpe ratio 
of 1.6, which is estimated by factors containing 28 anomalies. 
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industries are left unexplained, suggesting a possible mispricing effect. To investigate this 
issue, we undertake a nonparametric approach similar to that of Lakonishok et al. (1994). The 
risk-based argument says that, if losing industries are riskier than winning industries, the former 
should outperform the latter particularly in good states of the economy. However, there should 
be no contrarian performance in bad states of the economy, in which the marginal utility of 
wealth is high, making the risky losing industries unattractive to risk-averse investors. To test 
this prediction, we examine the consistency of the performance of the industry contrarian 
strategies across different states of the economy. The profits of these strategies are estimated 
from Eq.(1).  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 8 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The first approach examines industry contrarian performance during extremely bad 
times. Our sample period includes three waves of UK economic recessions, which are defined 
as negative GDP growth in two consecutive quarters as reported by the Office of National 
Statistics (ONS). We define the rest of the sample period as “other times”. Panel A of Table 8 
reports the results. In the first two waves of recessions (1980: Q1 to 1981: Q2 and 1991: Q1 to 
1991: Q4), losing and winning industries have very similar performance. The difference 
between the two portfolios’ returns is insignificant. However, in the most recent recession 
(2008: Q2 to 2009: Q3), losing industries have significantly higher returns than winning 
industries. This result indicates that the industry contrarian strategy is still profitable in 
recession times, inconsistent with the risk-based explanation. Following Lakonishok et al. 
(1994), we also evaluate the industry contrarian performance across four states of the economy, 
according to the overall market performance, using the equally weighted market return.24 The 
four states are the 25 worst stock return months, the remaining 149 negative return months, the 
184 positive months other than the 25 best, and the best 25 months in the sample. Panel B 
provides the results. The first two columns show that industry contrarian strategies are 
profitable when the overall market experiences the worst and best performance. The evidence 
that industry contrarian performance also happens in bad states of the economy contradicts the 
risk-based explanation, suggesting that losing industries are not riskier than winning industries.  
4.5.4 Valuation uncertainty  
                                                          
24 Note that using real GDP growth to define the states of the economy does not affect our conclusions. Further 
details of these results are available upon request.  
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Previous studies show that stocks with a great amount of valuation uncertainty, which makes 
arbitrage risky, costly and limited, are likely to be mispriced (e.g. Merton, 1987; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997; Lam and Wei, 2011). The uncertainty can rise from a poor information 
environment, which can be a barrier to fair valuation of firms. Thus, if long-term industry 
reversals are due to mispricing, the reversals should be more pronounced for stocks from 
industries with high informational opacity. We use four proxies for valuation uncertainty, 
namely accruals, idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL), competitiveness and analyst coverage.  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 9 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Accruals are important accounting information which should be used by investors to 
adjust operating cash flows and earnings. However, Hirshleifer et al. (2012) and Sloan (1996) 
find that investors have limited resources to incorporate accruals into the share valuation 
process. Hirshleifer et al. (2009) show that industry-based accruals can also predict future 
returns for industry portfolios, implying that accruals can be a barrier to the proper valuation 
of industries. We define accruals in the same way as Sloan (1996). We aggregate the accrual 
elements at the industry level to obtain the industry accrual ratio.25 Then, in June of each year, 
we rank industries by their accrual ratios and use the median accrual ratio to define high and 
low accrual industries from July of this year to June of next year. Finally, we repeat the Fama-
MacBeth regressions (Eq.(1)) for stocks in high and low accrual industries. If industry 
contrarian performance is a mispricing effect, we expect industry reversals to be more 
pronounced in industries with high accruals. Panel A of Table 9 reports the average monthly 
returns across the entire five-year period. It shows that the industry contrarian strategy is 
profitable only in high accrual industries, consistent with the mispricing effect.  
IVOL is also widely used as a proxy for informational opacity. Krishnaswami and 
Subramaniam (1999) use IVOL as a measure of information asymmetry between firm insiders 
and outsiders. West (1988) and Kelly (2014) document a negative association between price 
informativeness and IVOL. In the context of industries, industry IVOL would indicate how 
well industry portfolios absorbed industry- and market-wide information. Boutchkova et al. 
                                                          
25 The accruals are defined as ( )industryACC CA CL Cash STDEBT DEP       (Sloan, 1996), where 
CA =change in current assets during period t; CL =change in current liabilities during period t; Cash =the 
change in cash and cash equivalents during period t; STDEBT =the change in the current maturities of long-
term debt and other short-term debt included in current liabilities during period t; and DEP =depreciation and 
amortization expenses during period t. 
industryACC  is divided by an industry’s lagged total assets to obtain the 
accrual ratio. The aggregated elements at the industry level reflect the value-weighted accruals. We also use the 
equally weighted approach to calculate industry-based accruals and our results remain quantitatively the same. 
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(2012) show that the sensitivity of an industry’s returns to political events can be a function of 
its IVOL. More recent studies show that IVOL is also a salient characteristic for short-sell 
constraints and risky arbitrage (Stambaugh et al., 2015; Mashruwala et al., 2006; Lam and Wei, 
2011). We argue that, if industry contrarian performance is driven by the mispricing effect, this 
effect should be stronger in industries with high IVOL. To estimate industry level IVOL, we 
construct daily value weighted returns for the 20 industries. Industry IVOL is the standard 
deviation of the residuals obtained by regressing daily industry portfolio returns on the daily 
FTSE All Share Index return from July of the previous year to June of the current year. The 20 
industries are then ranked by their IVOL, and the top (bottom) 10 industries are defined as high 
(low) IVOL industries from July of one year to June of the next. The sample stocks are 
separated into those in high and low IVOL industries for the running of the Fama-MacBeth 
regressions (Eq.(1)). Panel B shows that the industry contrarian strategy is profitable only in 
high IVOL industries, consistent with the mispricing effect.  
Competition across industries provides another important informational channel for 
investors to value stocks. Because firms in more concentrated industries can exercise 
significant pricing power on their products, they tend to disclose less information to the public, 
obscuring the fair value of stocks (e.g. Gal-Or, 1985; Botosan and Stanford, 2005; Ali et al., 
2014). On the other hand, firms in more competitive industries can attract a great amount of 
attention from investors, who will demand more information from analysts (e.g. Kross et al., 
1990; Lys and Soo, 1995; Das et al., 1998; Barth et al., 2001). As such, firms have more 
incentives to supply information to analysts in more competitive industries. Thus, the 
mispricing effect would predict a higher industry contrarian spread in more concentrated 
industries. We measure industry concentration using the Herfindahl index.26 Specifically, we 
calculate the Herfindahl index according to the last year’s financial reports for the 20 industries. 
The top (bottom) 10 industries are defined as highly (less) concentrated industries from July of 
one year to June of the next. Then, we run the Fama-MacBeth regressions for the highly and 
less concentrated industries separately. The results in Panel C suggest that, in highly 
concentrated industries, losing industry not only earn a positive return of 0.32% per month, but 
also significantly outperform winning industries by 0.30% per month. However, the industry 
contrarian profit disappears in less concentrated industries. This evidence is consistent with the 
notion that industry competition improves stock price adjustments to information.  
                                                          
26 The Herfindahl index is defined as 2
1
I
j ij
i
Herfindahl S

 , where ijS  is the market share of firm i in industry j 
in terms of net sales in each sample year. 
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Our final proxy for informational opacity is the number of analysts following. The 
role of financial analysts in disseminating information in financial markets has been widely 
documented (e.g. Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980; Admati, 1985; Bhushan, 1989). Piotroski and 
Roulstone (2004) and Chan and Hameed (2006) report that analyst activities help impound 
both industry and market relevant information into stock prices. This implies that industry 
contrarian performance should be weaker in industries with more analysts. We collect the 
number of analysts following each firm in June of each year. According to each stock’s industry 
membership, the number of analysts is aggregated in a given industry and then divided by the 
total number of firms in the industry.27 We define the top (bottom) 10 industries as high (low) 
analyst coverage industries from July of one year to June of the next. We run the Fama-
MacBeth regressions for the high and low analyst coverage industries separately. Panel D 
shows that, in high analyst coverage industries, industry contrarian performance is virtually 
zero. However, in low analyst coverage industries, losing industries significantly outperform 
winning industries. These findings highlight the role of financial analysts in improving 
information dissemination and are also consistent with the mispricing explanation of industry 
contrarian performance.  
 Securities with highly subjective valuations are risky and costly to arbitrage and 
therefore are likely to be affected by sentiment (see, e.g., Baker and Wurgler, 2006; Stambaugh 
et al., 2012). In this study, we find that the valuation uncertainty, measured by accruals, 
idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL), competitiveness and analyst coverage, is significantly higher 
in losing than winning industries.28 This suggests that stocks in losing industries are more 
difficult to value and riskier and costlier to arbitrage than their counterparts in winning 
industries. Because of the limits to arbitrage, stocks in losing industries should be more affected 
by sentiment and their returns are more likely to reverse in the long run. 
Overall, we show that the contrarian spreads are only significant in industries with high 
valuation uncertainty and these findings are robust to various risk-adjustment techniques.   
 
5. Conclusion 
This study investigates the role of past industry performance in predicting future stock returns 
in the UK market. We find that firms in losing industries significantly outperform those in 
                                                          
27 The data for analyst coverage is extracted from the Bloomberg database. The sample period is from 1997 to 
2011. We also use the aggregated number of analysts at the industry level to define high and low analyst 
coverage industries. The results are similar to those produced when using the number of analysts per firm in a 
given industry.  
28 These results are available upon request.  
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winning industries over the subsequent five years. These industry reversals remain strong and 
persistent after controlling for stock momentum, industry momentum, seasonal effects and 
traditional risk factors. We also find a strong industry influence on stock return reversals when 
we condition industry returns on past performance. Furthermore, we compare industry 
reversals with the stock reversals generated from individual stocks’ past performance. We find 
that stock reversals come exclusively in January and April, consistent with the tax loss selling 
hypothesis. However, the absence of seasonal patterns in industry reversals does not support 
the tax-based explanation. Further analysis suggests that past industry performance is the main 
determinant of stock reversals. However, past stock performance cannot explain industry 
reversals. The overall results suggest that past industry performance contains salient 
information about long-term stock returns. Next, we investigate whether industry reversals are 
driven by risk or are a result of mispricing. We show that industry contrarian performance 
appears in both good and bad states of the economy, inconsistent with the risk-based 
explanation. We also find that industry contrarian performance is more prominent in industries 
with high valuation uncertainty, consistent with the mispricing effect.    
Our results have several important implications. First, we show that industries play an 
important role in conditional asset pricing. Specifically, while previous studies show that 
contemporaneous industry returns have a negligible impact on stock returns (e.g., Fama and 
French, 1997; Heston and Rouwenhorst, 1994; Griffin and Karolyi, 1998), we find that past 
industry performance affects future stock returns. Second, we highlight the importance of 
industry components in explaining stock reversals and show that the contrarian profits are more 
likely to represent mispricing than risk. Finally, our study suggests that investors are better off 
exploiting contrarian profits by focusing on industry portfolios. 
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Table 1 Description and summary statistics of industry 
The table reports basic characteristics of the 20 super-sector based industry portfolios according to the 
International Classification of Benchmarks (ICB). The 20 industries are formed monthly from January 1975 to 
December 2011. The average number of stocks included in each industry is reported. The average percentage of 
total market capitalisations, five-year raw returns, and five-year excess market returns are the time-series means 
of cross-sectional industry averages in each month. Five-year raw returns are calculated from five-year value-
weighted industry return indexes and five-year excess market returns are calculated from five-year industries’ raw 
returns minus five-year FTSE All Share market index returns. The last row average is reported the times series 
means for the statistics across 20 industries in each month.  
Industry 
code Industry Name
Avg. No. 
of Stocks
Avg. % of 
Market Cap.
5-year Raw 
Return
5-year Excess 
Market Return
1 Oil & Gas 43 8.48% 0.7220 0.1594
2 Chemicals 40 3.21% 0.5103 -0.0512
3 Basic Resources 51 2.99% 0.5454 -0.0200
4 Constructions & Materials 54 2.18% 0.4859 -0.0748
5 Industrial Goods & Services 364 7.68% 0.1853 -0.3768
6 Automibles & Parts 6 0.79% 0.0924 -0.4699
7 Food & Beverage 70 5.07% 0.6780 0.1169
8 Personal & Household Goods 138 3.58% 0.7781 0.2163
9 Health Care 50 5.27% 0.9026 0.3389
10 Retail 137 5.56% 0.5772 0.0155
11 Media 86 4.12% 0.4488 -0.1123
12 Travel & Leisure 90 2.65% 0.4998 -0.0622
13 Telecommuincations 18 6.67% 1.2969 0.7309
14 Utilities 31 4.14% 0.5856 0.2063
15 Banks 26 20.03% 0.4146 -0.1467
16 Insurance 38 8.77% 0.5106 -0.0505
17 Financial Services 90 2.31% 0.6368 0.0738
18 Technology 83 0.99% 0.2801 -0.2832
19 Real Estate 95 1.92% 0.5202 -0.0425
20 Others 96 3.50% 0.2414 -0.4879
Average 98 6.70% 0.5418 -0.0135    
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Table 2 Correlation matrix for long term reversal variables 
The table is a correlation matrix for long term reversal variables and reports time-series means of cross-sectional correlations in each month. The variables in the matrix are various 
winner and loser identities according to individual stock and industry past performance and their interactions. 5-year winner (5-year loser) is a long term stock performance dummy 
that takes the value of 1 if a stock i’s past five-year return is ranked in the top (bottom) 30% of all stocks in month t, and zero otherwise. 5-year winning Ind. (5-year losing Ind.) is a 
dummy that takes the value of one if a stock i belongs to long-term winning and losing industry in month t, and zero otherwise. Long term winning and losing industry are defined as 
the top and bottom three industries ranked on five-year value-weighted average industry returns. 5  Excessyear Winner ( 5  Excessyear Loser ) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 
one if a stock i’s industry adjusted five-year return is ranked in the top (bottom) 30% of all stocks in month t, and zero otherwise. The industry adjusted five-year return is calculated 
as the stock’s own five-year return minus the value-weighed five-year return for the industry to which the stock belongs. Conversely, we re-define winning and losing industries in 
terms of excess stock returns. All stocks are first placed into quintile portfolios according to the stock five-year performance measure. The excess stock return is a stock’s five-year 
return minus the value-weighted five-year return of the quintile portfolio to which the stock belongs. For each o industry, we then average the excess stock returns according to each 
stock’s industry membership. We choose top and bottom 3 portfolios as new winning and losing industries based on each industry’s excess stock returns. If a stock belongs to the 
winning (losing) industries, the dummy 5  Excessyear winningInd  ( 5  Excessyear losing Ind ) is equal to one, and zero otherwise. Ind 5year winnerwithin and Ind 5year loserwithin are long 
term within-industry winners and losers according to an individual stock’s five-year return ranking within its industry. All sample stocks are ranked by their five-year returns within 
each industry in terms of their industry memberships. The top (bottom) 30% of stocks in a given industry is labelled as within-industry winners (losers). 
 
5-year 
winner 5-year loser
 5-year 
winning Ind
 5-year losing 
Ind
5-year 
winner
Excess
5-year 
loser
Excess
5year winning 
Ind
Excess
5year losing 
Ind
Excess
Ind.5year 
winner
within
Ind.5year 
loser
within
5-year winner 1
5-year loser -0.4279 1
5-year winning Ind 0.1754 -0.1467 1
5-year losing Ind -0.1743 0.1651 -0.1845 1
5-year winner
Excess
0.7932 -0.4272 -0.1437 0.0505 1
5-year loser
Excess
-0.4202 0.7229 0.1329 -0.2312 -0.4282 1
5year winning Ind
Excess
0.1059 -0.1245 0.0977 -0.1158 0.1238 -0.0343 1
5year losing Ind
Excess
-0.1130 0.1268 -0.0815 0.1736 -0.1179 0.0539 -0.1278 1
Ind.5year winner
within
0.7909 -0.0550 -0.0129 0.0054 0.3020 -0.2908 -0.0779 0.0847 1
Ind.5year loser
within
-0.0559 0.7862 -0.0108 0.0063 -0.2866 0.2952 0.1523 -0.0843 -0.2933 1  
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Table 3 Identifying industry reversals  
We estimate 60 ( 1,...,60)j   cross-sectional regressions on a monthly basis between February 1980 and December 2011 as following 
0 1 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 1 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 ,
8 , 9 , 10 , 11
52 52
5 5 5
it jt jt i t jt i t jt i t jt i t j jt i t j jt i t j jt i t j
jt i t j jt i t j jt i t j
R b b R b size b BM b wkhWinner b wkhLoser b IndMomWinner b IndMomLoser
b yearWinner b yearLoser b yearWinningInd b
      
  
       
    ,5yearjt i t j ijtLosingInd e 
 
itR is the return to stock i  in month t. , 1i tR  , , 1i tsize   and , 1i tBM  are the return, book-to-market ratio and natural logarithm of market capitalisation of stock i in month t-1 net of the 
month t-1 cross-sectional mean.  52wkhWinneri,t-j(52wkhLoseri,t-j) is the 52 week high winner (loser) dummy that takes the value of 1 if the 52-week high measure for stock i is ranked 
in the top (bottom) 30% in month t-j. The 52-week high measure in month t-j is the ratio of the price level in month t-j to the maximum price achieved in month t-j-12 to t-j. 
IndMomWinneri,t-j (IndMomLoseri,t-j) is an industry momentum dummy that takes the value of one if a stock i belongs to short-term winning (losing) industries in month t-j. Short term 
winning and losing industries are defined the top and bottom three industries ranked on value-weighted 12-month industry average returns. 5-year winner (5-year loser) is a dummy 
that takes the value of one if a stock i’s past five-year return is ranked in the top (bottom) 30% of all stocks in month t, and zero otherwise. 5-year winningIndi,t-j (5-year losing Indi,t-j) 
is a dummy that takes the value of one if a stock i belongs to long-term winning and  losing industry in month t-j. Long term winning and losing industry are defined as the top and 
bottom three industries ranked on value-weighted five-year average industry returns. The coefficient estimates of a given independent variable are average over 1,2,...,12j  for 
column labelled (1, 12), 13,14,...,24j  for column (13, 24)… and 1,2,...,60j  for columns labelled (1, 60). The numbers reported in the table are the time series averages of these 
averages in percentage per month. Time series average numbers of observations for each month based on cross-sectional regressions are reported in the last row. Newey-West (1987) 
adjusted t-statistics are reported in parentheses.  
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Monthly 
return 
(1,12)
Monthly 
return (1,12) 
Jan & Apr 
Excl.
Monthly 
return 
(13,24)
Monthly 
return (13,24) 
Jan & Apr 
Excl.
Monthly 
return 
(25,36)
Monthly 
return (25,36) 
Jan & Apr 
Excl.
Monthly 
return 
(37,48)
Monthly 
return 
(37,48) Jan & 
Apr Excl. 
Monthly 
return 
(49,60)
Monthly 
return (49,60) 
Jan & Apr 
Excl. 
Monthly 
return 
(1,60)
Monthly 
return (1,60) 
Jan & Apr 
Excl.
Intercept 0.78 0.54 0.68 0.45 0.70 0.49 0.75 0.41 0.78 0.46 0.73 0.47
(2.94) (2.54) (3.54) (1.96) (2.91) (1.95) (2.76) (1.88) (2.89) (1.78) (2.94) (1.82)
R i,t-1 -1.21 -0.83 -1.18 -0.97 -1.27 -1.00 -1.05 -0.79 -1.10 -0.73 -1.16 -0.87
(-2.69) (-1.89) (-2.54) (-2.47) (-2.76) (-2.17) (-2.43) (-1.83) (-2.69) (-2.54) (-3.49) (-2.67)
Size i,t-1 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 -0.06 -0.03 -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02
(-1.66) (-1.67) (-2.23) (-1.79) (-2.18) (-1.78) (-1.88) (-1.60) (-2.20) (-1.87) (-2.52) (-2.00)
BM i,t-1 0.28 0.31 0.28 0.30 0.27 0.30 0.26 0.30 0.26 0.29 0.27 0.30
(5.94) (5.79) (5.88) (5.72) (5.73) (5.58) (5.37) (5.25) (5.22) (5.09) (5.65) (5.51)   
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Monthly 
return 
(1,12)
Monthly 
return (1,12) 
Jan & Apr 
Excl.
Monthly 
return 
(13,24)
Monthly 
return 
(13,24) Jan 
& Apr Excl.
Monthly 
return 
(25,36)
Monthly 
return 
(25,36) Jan 
& Apr Excl.
Monthly 
return 
(37,48)
Monthly 
return 
(37,48) Jan 
& Apr Excl. 
Monthly 
return 
(49,60)
Monthly 
return 
(49,60) Jan 
& Apr Excl. 
Monthly 
return 
(1,60)
Monthly 
return (1,60) 
Jan & Apr 
Excl.
52week high winner 0.46 0.54 0.03 0.10 -0.00 0.05 0.04 0.09 -0.01 0.00 0.10 0.15
(5.94) (7.17) (0.74) (2.00) (-0.10) (1.25) (1.39) (2.58) (-0.61) (0.23) (3.51) (3.16)
52week high loser -1.05 -1.16 -0.27 -0.43 -0.26 -0.36 -0.25 -0.31 -0.16 -0.20 -0.39 -0.49
(-7.68) (-8.71) (-3.11) (-4.60) (-3.22) (-4.27) (-3.57) (-4.03) (-2.49) (-2.89) (-5.57) (-6.72)
Ind_mom_winner 0.15 0.05 -0.00 0.05 -0.12 -0.08 -0.06 -0.03 0.03 0.07 -0.03 0.02
(1.93) (0.75) (-0.13) (0.49) (-1.38) (-0.80) (-0.77) (-0.39) (0.29) (0.59) (-0.57) (0.23)
Ind_mom_loser -0.18 -0.14 0.07 0.05 -0.11 -0.10 -0.00 0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.05 -0.03
(-2.00) (-1.44) (0.91) (0.52) (-1.47) (-1.19) (-0.07) (0.30) (-0.09) (0.31) (-1.04) (-0.57)
5-year winner -0.04 0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00
(-0.79) (0.43) (-0.25) (0.13) (-0.44) (-0.19) (0.15) (0.47) (-1.22) (-0.40) (-0.40) (0.15)
5-year loser 0.07 -0.07 0.11 0.02 0.12 0.07 0.16 0.10 0.10 0.06 0.11 0.04
(0.79) (-0.89) (1.80) (0.29) (1.83) (0.96) (2.24) (1.34) (1.59) (0.93) (2.07) (0.78)
5-year winning Ind -0.09 0.01 -0.04 -0.02 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.09 -0.13 -0.12 -0.02 0.02
(-0.88) (0.13) (-0.98) (-1.00) (1.01) (0.95) (0.76) (0.80) (-1.29) (-1.21) (-0.09) (0.26)
5-year losing Ind 0.06 0.08 0.17 0.22 0.32 0.32 0.37 0.40 0.45 0.49 0.27 0.30
(0.71) (0.89) (1.88) (2.20) (3.43) (3.33) (3.91) (3.79) (4.30) (4.26) (3.86) (3.90)
5-year loser- 0.10 -0.10 0.12 0.01 0.13 0.08 0.15 0.07 0.11 0.08 0.12 0.04
5-year winner (1.24) (-0.94) (1.68) (0.15) (1.76) (0.88) (1.90) (0.98) (1.47) (0.95) (1.96) (0.56)
5-year losing Ind- 0.15 0.07 0.21 0.23 0.26 0.27 0.29 0.31 0.57 0.60 0.29 0.29
5-year winning Ind (1.42) (0.48) (1.75) (1.85) (2.01) (1.99) (2.45) (2.50) (3.81) (3.56) (2.69) (2.51)
Avg. obs 1439 1330 1269 1204 1137 1265   
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Table 4 Comparisons between stock and industry reversals 
We estimate 60 ( 1,...,60)j   cross-sectional regressions on a monthly basis between February 1980 and December 2011 as following for Panel A 
,
0 1 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 1 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 ,
8 , 9 , 10
52 52
5 5 5
i t j
it jt jt i t jt i t jt i t jt i t j jt i t j jt i t j jt i t j
Stock
jt i t j jt i t j jt l
R b b R b size b BM b wkhWinner b wkhLoser b IndMomWinner b IndMomLoser
b yearWinner b yearLoser b Neutral year
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      
 
       
   
,, 11 ,
5
i t j
stock
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The following equation is estimated for Panel B 
,
0 1 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 1 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 ,
9 , 10
52 52 5
5
i t j
it jt jt i t jt i t jt i t jt i t j jt i t j jt i t j jt i t j jt i t j
indu
jt i t j jt
R b b R b size b BM b wkhWinner b wkhLoser b IndMomWinner b IndMomLoser b yearWinningInd
b yearLosingInd b Neutral

       

        
  , 11 , ,5 5
stry industry
i t j jt i t j i t j ijtyearWinnner b Neutral yearLoser e     
 
itR is the return to stock i  in month t. , 1i tR  , , 1i tBM  and , 1i tsize   are the return, book-to-market ratio and natural logarithm of market capitalisation of stock i in month t-1 net of the 
month t-1 cross-sectional mean.  52wkhWinneri,t-j (52wkhLoseri,t-j) is the 52 week high winner (loser) dummy that takes the value of one if the 52-week high measure for stock i is 
ranked in the top (bottom) 30% in month t-j, and zero otherwise. The 52-week high measure in month t-j is the ratio of the price level in month t-j to the maximum price achieved in 
month t-j-12 to t-j. IndMomWinneri,t-j(IndMomLoseri,t-j) is a dummy that takes the value of one if a stock i belongs to short-term winning (losing) industries in month t-j, and zero 
otherwise. Short term winning and losing industries are defined the top and bottom 3 industries ranked on 12-month value-weighted average industry returns. 5-year winneri,t-j (5-year 
loseri,t-j) is a dummy that takes the value of one if a stock i’s past five-year return is ranked in the top (bottom) 30% of all stocks in month t-j, and zero otherwise. ,
stock
i t jNeutral   is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one if a stock i is neither five-year losers nor five-year winners in month t-j, and zero otherwise. ,
industry
i t jNeutral  is a dummy variable that takes 
value of one if a stock i belongs to neither winning  nor losing industries according to five-year value-weighted industry returns, and zero otherwise. 5-year winning Indi,t-j ( 5-year 
losing Indi,t-j) is a dummy that takes the value of one if a stock i belongs to long-term winning and  losing industry in month t-j, and zero otherwise.  Long-term winning and losing 
industry are defined as the top and bottom three industries ranked on five-year value-weighted average industry returns. The coefficient diffidence between 
11 10jt jtb b in Panel A can 
be interpreted as industry contrarian returns with neutral stock performance.  The coefficient diffidence between 
11 10jt jtb b in Panel B can be interpreted as stock contrarian returns 
with neutral industry performance. The coefficient estimates of a given independent variable are average over 1,2,...,12j  for column labelled (1, 12), 13,14,...,24j  for column 
(13, 24)… and 1,2,...,60j  for columns labelled (1, 60). The numbers reported in the table are the time series averages of these averages in percentage per month. Newey-West 
(1987) adjusted t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Coefficients on control variables are omitted for brevity.  
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Monthly 
return (1,12)
Monthly 
return (13,24)
Monthly 
return (25,36)
Monthly 
return (37,48)
Monthly 
return (49,60)
Monthly return 
(1,60)
5-year winner 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 -0.09 0.00
(0.56) (0.58) (0.72) (0.56) (-1.53) (0.08)
5-year loser 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.17 0.05 0.11
(1.61) (1.65) (1.44) (2.35) (0.08) (1.90)
Neutral
stock
* -0.00 -0.01 0.04 0.06 -0.22 -0.03
5year Winning Ind (-0.04) (-0.07) (0.41) (0.51) (-1.77) (-0.17)
Neutral
stock
* 0.11 0.17 0.31 0.37 0.36 0.26
5year Losing Ind (1.25) (1.76) (3.17) (3.64) (3.57) (3.75)
5year losing Ind- 5year winning Ind 0.11 0.17 0.26 0.31 0.58 0.29
 amg Neutral
stock
(0.82) (1.52) (1.95) (2.03) (3.98) (2.08)
5year winning Ind -0.11 -0.04 0.14 0.12 -0.14 -0.01
(-1.03) (-0.42) (1.42) (1.12) (-1.39) (-0.08)
5year losing Ind 0.04 0.15 0.31 0.40 0.44 0.27
(0.38) (1.59) (3.12) (3.96) (4.14) (3.54)
Neutral
industry
* 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.08 -0.03 0.03
5-year winner (0.34) (0.27) (1.11) (1.46) (-0.52) (0.68)
Neutral
industry
* -0.03 0.03 0.01 0.13 0.02 0.03
5-year loser (-0.30) (0.34) (0.15) (1.68) (0.24) (0.44)
5-year loser-5-year winner -0.05 0.01 -0.06 0.05 0.05 -0.00
 amg Neutral
industry
(-0.42) (0.11) (-0.78) (0.55) (0.32) (-0.04)
Panel B
Panel A
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Table 5 Adjusting for past performance 
We estimate 60 ( 1,...,60)j   cross-sectional regressions on a monthly basis between February 1980 and December 2011 as following for Panel A 
,
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The following equation is estimated for Panel B. 
,
0 1 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 1 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 ,
8 , 9 , 10
52 52
5 5 5
i t j
it jt jt i t jt i t jt i t jt i t j jt i t j jt i t j jt i t j
Exc
jt i t j jt i t j jt
R b b R b size b BM b wkhWinner b wkhLoser b IndMomWinner b IndMomLoser
b yearWinner b yearLoser b yearWinnningInd

      
 
       
  
,11
5
i t j
ess Excess
jt ijtb yearLosingInd e 
 
itR is the return to stock i  in month t. , 1i tR  , , 1i tBM  and , 1i tsize   are the return, book-to-market ratio and natural logarithm of market capitalisation of stock i in month t-1 net of the 
month t-1 cross-sectional mean. 52wkhWinneri,t-j(52wkhLoseri,t-j) is the 52 week high winner (loser) dummy that takes the value of one if the 52-week high measure for stock i is ranked 
in the top (bottom) 30% in month t-j, and zero otherwise. The 52-week high measure in month t-j is the ratio of the price level in month t-j to the maximum price achieved in month t-
j-12 to t-j. IndMomWinneri,t-j (IndMomLoseri,t-j) is a dummy that takes the value of one if a stock i belongs to short-term winning (losing) industries in month t-j, and zero otherwise. 
Short term winning and losing industries are defined the top and bottom three industries ranked on 12-month value-weighted average industry returns.  5-year winneri,t-j (5-year loseri,t-
j) is a dummy that takes the value of one if a stock i’s past five-year return is ranked in the top (bottom) 30% of all stocks in month t-j, and zero otherwise. Ind. 5-year winneri,t-j (Ind. 
5-year loseri,t-j) is a dummy that takes the value of one if a stock i belongs to long-term winning and  losing industry in month t-j, and zero otherwise. Long term winning and losing 
industry are defined as the top and bottom three industries ranked on five-year value-weighted average industry returns.  ,5  
Excess
i t jyear Winner  ( ,5  
Excess
i t jyear Loser  ) is a dummy variable 
that takes value of one if a stock i’s industry adjusted five-year return is ranked in the top (bottom) 30% of all stocks in month t-j, and zero otherwise. The industry adjusted five-year 
return is calculated as the stock’s own five-year return minus the value-weighed five-year return for the industry to which the stock belongs. Conversely, we re-define winning and 
losing industries in terms of an excess stock return. All stocks are first placed into quintile portfolios according to the stock five-year performance measure. The excess stock return is 
a stock’s five-year return minus the value-weighted five-year return of the quintile portfolio to which the stock belongs. For each industry, we then average the excess stock returns 
according to each stock’s industry membership. We choose top and bottom three portfolios as new winning and losing industries based on each industry’s excess stock returns. If a 
stock belongs to the new winning (losing) industries, the dummy ,5  
Excess
i t jyear winningInd   ( ,5  
Excess
i t jyear losingInd  ) is equal to one in month t-j, and zero otherwise. The coefficient 
diffidence between 
11 10jt jtb b in Panel A can be interpreted as stock contrarian returns in excess of past industry performance. The coefficient diffidence between 11 10jt jtb b in Panel 
B can be interpreted as industry contrarian returns in excess of past stock performance. The coefficient estimates of a given independent variable are average over 1,2,...,12j  for 
column labelled (1, 12), 13,14,...,24j  for column (13, 24)… and 1,2,...,60j  for columns labelled (1, 60). The numbers reported in the table are the time series averages of these 
averages in percentage per month. Newey-West (1987) adjusted t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Coefficients on control variables are omitted for brevity.  
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Monthly 
return (1,12)
Monthly 
return (13,24)
Monthly 
return (25,36)
Monthly 
return (37,48)
Monthly 
return (49,60)
Monthly 
return (1,60)
5-year winning Ind -0.06 -0.01 0.09 0.09 -0.10 0.01
(-0.60) (-0.09) (1.21) (0.83) (-1.20) (0.17)
5-year losing Ind 0.04 0.15 0.31 0.37 0.44 0.26
(0.45) (1.68) (3.30) (4.01) (4.30) (3.70)
5-year winner
Excess
0.05 0.02 0.03 0.05 -0.04 0.03
(1.05) (0.50) (0.60) (1.02) (-0.82) (0.62)
5-year loser
Excess
0.04 0.04 0.01 0.15 0.02 0.05
(0.47) (0.56) (0.22) (1.96) (0.35) (1.01)
5-year loser
Excess
- -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.10 0.06 0.03
5-year winner
Excess
(-0.20) (0.11) (-0.24) (1.33) (0.82) (0.42)
5-year winner 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.06 -0.00
(0.17) (0.14) (0.14) (-0.08) (-1.16) (-0.16)
5-year loser -0.00 0.08 0.09 0.15 0.12 0.08
(-0.01) (1.04) (1.33) (1.96) (2.06) (1.68)
5year winning Ind
Excess
-0.07 -0.12 -0.06 -0.08 -0.18 -0.09
(-0.67) (-1.09) (-0.42) (-0.57) (-1.53) (-0.88)
5year losing Ind
Excess
0.12 0.14 0.17 0.10 0.19 0.16
(1.33) (1.49) (1.83) (1.11) (2.01) (2.29)
5year losing Ind
Excess
- 0.18 0.26 0.23 0.18 0.35 0.25
5year winning Ind
Excess
(1.25) (1.66) (1.29) (1.01) (2.53) (1.93)
Panel A
Panel B
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Table 6 Risk-adjusted returns 
We estimate 60 ( 1,...,60)j   cross-sectional regressions on a monthly basis between January 1975 and December 2011  
0 1 , 1 2 , 1 4 , 1 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 ,
10 , 11
52 52 5 5
5
it jt jt i t jt i t jt i t jt i t j jt i t j jt i t j jt i t j jt i t j jt i t j
jt i t j
R b b R b size b BM b wkhWinner b wkhLoser b IndMomWinner b IndMomLoser b yearWinner b yearLoser
b yearWinningInd b
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
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itR is the return to stock i  in month t. , 1i tR  , , 1i tBM  and , 1i tsize   are the return, book-to-market ratio and natural logarithm of market capitalisation of stock i in month t-1 net of the 
month t-1 cross-sectional mean. 52wkhWinneri,t-j(52wkhLoseri,t-j) is the 52 week high winner (loser) dummy that takes the value of one if the 52-week high measure for stock i is ranked 
in the top (bottom) 30% in month t-j, and zero otherwise. The 52-week high measure in month t-j is the ratio of the price level in month t-j to the maximum price achieved in month t-
j-12 to t-j. IndMomWinneri,t-j(IndMomLoseri,t-j) is a dummy that takes the value of one if a stock i belongs to short-term winning (losing) industries in month t-j, and zero otherwise. 
Short term winning and losing industries are defined the top and bottom three industries ranked on 12-month value-weighted average industry returns, respectively. 5-year winneri,t-j 
(5-year loseri,t-j) is a dummy that takes the value of one if a stock i’s past five-year return is ranked in the top (bottom) 30% of all stocks in month t-j, and zero otherwise. 5-year 
winning Indi,t-j ( 5-year losing Indi,t-j) is a dummy that takes the value of one if a stock i belongs to long-term winning and  losing industry in month t-j, and zero otherwise.  Long term 
winning and losing industry are defined as the top and bottom three industries ranked on five-year value-weighted average industry returns. Long term industry contrarian performance 
is measured by buying stocks in losing industries and selling those in winning industries (e.g.
11 10jt jtb b ) in month t-j. The coefficient estimates of a given independent variable are 
average over 1,2,...,12j  for column labelled (1, 12), 13,14,...,24j  for column (13, 24)… and 1,2,...,60j  for columns labelled (1, 60). To obtain risk-adjusted returns, we run 
time series averages (one for each average), which are computed from the cross-sectional regressions, on the Fama-French (1996) three-factor model in Panel A.  We also run the 
averages on the Fama-French (2015) five-factor model, including two additional factors (the profitability factor and the asset growth factor) and the intercepts from the time-series 
regression is reported in Panel B. The numbers in the table are in percentage per month. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Monthly 
return (1,12)
Monthly 
return (13,24)
Monthly 
return 
(25,36)
Monthly 
return 
(37,48)
Monthly 
return (49,60)
Monthly 
return (1,60)
5-year winner -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 -0.05 -0.03
(-0.60) (-0.67) (-0.49) (-0.23) (-1.18) (-0.80)
5-year loser -0.04 0.05 0.06 0.12 0.02 0.05
(-0.49) (0.60) (0.95) (1.68) (0.46) (0.86)
5year winning Ind -0.05 -0.04 0.05 0.10 -0.12 -0.00
(-0.46) (-0.34) (0.54) (1.15) (-1.15) (-0.07)
5year losing Ind 0.04 0.17 0.30 0.36 0.43 0.26
(0.47) (1.93) (3.42) (3.54) (3.66) (3.09)
Panel A Fama-French 3-Factor Adjusted Returns
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Monthly 
return (1,12)
Monthly 
return (13,24)
Monthly 
return (25,36)
Monthly 
return (37,48)
Monthly 
return 
(49,60)
Monthly 
return (1,60)
5-year loser- -0.00 0.09 0.09 0.13 0.07 0.09
5-year winner (-0.05) (0.85) (1.06) (1.55) (1.05) (1.42)
5year losing Ind- 0.09 0.20 0.25 0.25 0.54 0.27
5year winning Ind (0.67) (1.69) (1.92) (2.32) (3.18) (2.54)
5-year winner -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.07 -0.05
(-0.98) (-1.02) (-1.12) (-1.03) (-1.26) (-1.41)
5-year loser -0.09 -0.03 0.00 0.14 0.11 0.03
(-1.16) (-0.40) (0.08) (1.93) (1.62) (0.48)
5year winning Ind 0.06 0.08 0.11 0.13 -0.12 0.05
(0.59) (0.81) (1.01) (1.19) (-1.20) (0.65)
5year losing Ind 0.02 0.13 0.31 0.38 0.31 0.24
(0.04) (1.53) (3.31) (2.75) (2.78) (2.89)
5-year loser- -0.04 0.03 0.07 0.19 0.17 0.08
5-year winner (-0.42) (0.31) (0.78) (2.37) (2.18) (1.28)
5year losing Ind- -0.04 0.05 0.21 0.25 0.43 0.19
5year winning Ind (-0.36) (0.40) (1.78) (1.83) (2.89) (1.86)
Panel B Fama-French 5-Factor Adjusted Returns
 
  
41 
 
Table 7 The Sharpe ratio 
 
Panel A reports the monthly Sharpe ratio for each individual factor and long term contrarian performance for stocks and industries. 5-year Ind. is industry contrarian performance by 
longing in stocks in losing industries and shorting in stocks in winning industries. 5-year stock is stock contrarian performance by longing in loser stocks and shorting in winner stocks. 
The two types of contrarian performance are estimated by the previous cross-sectional Fama-MacBeth regressions. The Sharpe ratio is calculated as the ratio of the mean return to its 
standard deviation for each factor and type of contrarian performance. MKT, SMB and HML stands for the market, the size and the value factors in Fama-French (1993) three-factor 
model. 5F_SMB, 5F_HML, 5F_ROE and 5F_INV are the size, the value, the profitability and the investment factors in Fama-French (2015) five-factor model. Panel B reports the 
maximum monthly Sharpe ratio achievable from each factor model (i.e. the three-factor model and the five-factor model) and each type of contrarian performance. The maximum 
Sharpe ratio is calculated as  1' f f fV 
 , in which f  is the vector of mean factor returns and fV  is the variance-covariance matrix of the factor returns. The last row in Panel B 
reports the p-value for the null hypothesis that the factor risk premia are jointly equal to zero [(T-N)/N]SSR is distributed central F(N, T-N) where N is the number of portfolios, T is 
the number of time-series observations and SSR is the maximum squared Sharpe ratio.  
 
MKT SMB HML 5F_SMB 5F_HML 5F_ROE 5F_INV 5-year Ind. 5-year stock
0.1098 0.0285 0.1032 0.0242 0.1005 0.0802 0.2512 0.1337 0.1017
CAPM 3F-model 5F-model 5-year Ind. 5-year stock
0.1098 0.1503 0.2981 0.2525 0.1351
(0.01) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Panel A Sharpe ratios
Individual factors Contrarian performance
Panel B Maximum Sharpe ratios
Factor models Contrarian performance
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Table 8 Economic States and industry contrarian performance 
 
This table reports results of industry contrarian performance according to different economic states. The monthly industry contrarian performance is estimated by the cross-sectional 
Fama-MacBeth regressions (Eq.(1)). Panel A reports the industry contrarian performance in the three waves of economic recessions according to the Office of National Statistics 
(ONS) in the UK. The rest of the months are defined as “other times”. Panel B reports the performance of industry contrarian portfolios in four states according to the overall market 
performance measured by the equally weighted market return index. The four states the 25 worst stock return months, the remaining 149 negative return months, the 184 positive 
months other than the 25 best, and the best 25 months in the sample. The last rows in Panel A and B report average GDP growth rates and market returns during each sub-sample 
period. The numbers in the table are in percentage. Newey-West (1987) adjusted t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
1980:Q1-1981:Q2 1991:Q1-1991:Q4 2008:Q2-2009:Q3 Other times
Losing industries 0.01 0.37 -0.15 0.32
(0.04) (1.46) (-0.89) (3.04)
Winning industries 0.23 0.15 -1.55 0.05
(0.33) (0.49) (-2.37) (0.90)
Losing industries- -0.21 0.23 1.40 0.26
Winning industries (-0.36) (0.74) (2.42) (2.30)
Avg. GDP Growth -2.41 -1.49 -4.41 3.15
Best 25 months Worst 25 months Next  Best and Positive(184) Next Worst and Negative (149)
Losing industries 1.17 -0.22 0.43 0.07
(2.61) (-1.18) (4.87) (0.91)
Winning industries 0.30 -1.28 0.10 0.03
(0.69) (-3.37) (1.56) (0.42)
Losing industries- 0.87 1.06 0.33 0.03
Winning industries (1.84) (1.98) (2.05) (0.21)
Avg. Market ret 8.38 -12.65 2.37 -2.54
Panel A: ONS Recessions
Panel B: Classified by the overall market performance
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Table 9 Valuation Uncertainty and Industry Contrarian Performance 
This table reports industry contrarian performance conditioning on accruals, idiosyncratic volatility, competition and analyst coverage. All four conditioning variables are constructed 
on the industry level.  We define accruals the same as Sloan (1996). Industry IVOL is the standard deviation of the residuals from regressing daily industry portfolio returns on daily 
FTSE All index return (the market return) from July of the last year to June of the current year. We measure industry concentration using the Herfindahl index. According to each 
stock’s industry membership, the number of analysts is aggregated in a given industry and then is divided by the total number of firms in the industry. The sample 20 industries are 
separated into the top (bottom) 10 industries according to one of the four measures. We then re-run the Fama-MacBeth regressions for the two groups to obtain raw returns. By using 
the Fama-French three-factor (FF3) and five-factor (FF5) models, we obtain risk-adjusted returns for each portfolio. t-statistics are reported in parentheses 
(1, 60) (1, 60) (1, 60) (1, 60)
Losing industries (L) 0.39 0.30 0.32 0.27
(3.12) (2.99) (3.01) (2.72)
Winning industries (W) -0.01 0.16 0.02 0.09
(-0.09) (1.42) (0.30) (0.88)
L-W 0.41 0.15 0.30 0.18
(2.53) (0.66) (2.31) (1.20)
FF3 0.49 0.12 0.22 0.14
(3.22) (1.06) (1.99) (1.34)
FF5 0.32 0.00 0.18 0.05
(2.33) (0.06) (1.70) (0.36)
Avg. obs 633 592 741 506
Avg. the accual ratio 0.1373 -0.1825 Avg. Herf 0.4968 0.1020
Losing industries (L) 0.46 0.19 0.07 0.70
(3.98) (2.39) (0.10) (3.86)
Winning industries (W) 0.08 0.08 -0.05 -0.01
(0.77) (0.87) (-0.20) (-0.10)
L-W 0.39 0.11 0.12 0.71
(2.60) (0.80) (0.67) (3.99)
FF3 0.44 0.11 -0.08 0.72
(3.20) (1.03) (-0.20) (3.65)
FF5 0.25 -0.05 -0.10 0.53
(1.98) (-0.42) (-1.02) (3.60)
Avg. obs 551 698 780 541
Avg. IVOL 0.0358 0.0068 Avg.Analyst 13 4
High IVOL industries Low IVOL  industries
Panel B Panel D
Low Analyst Cov.  IndustriesHigh Analyst Cov. Industries
Low Concentrated IndustriesHigh Concentrated IndustriesLow Accrual IndustriesHigh Accrual Industries
Panel A Panel C
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Appendix   
A1. Data type filters 
Non common equity Company name or data type search 
Duplicate a DUPLICATE DUPL DUP DUPE DULP 
DUPLI 
American Depository receipt b ADR GDR 
Preferred stocks PREFERRED PF PFD PREF  'PF' 
Warrants WARRANT WARRANTS WARRT 
Debt DEB DB DCB DEBT DEBENTURES 
Unit Trust TRUST UNIT TST UNIT UNIT TRUST UT 
Investment  company INVESTMENT TRUST INVESTMENT 
a 
If two firms have a same name without other distinguishable characteristics, we choose the firm with an 
earliest coverage in the Datastream to ensure no duplicated firms included.  
b We also check each stock’s quoted currency and remove those that are not quoted in the British Sterling. This 
procedure screens out American Depository Receipts traded on LSE.  
Note: This table lists words used in a screen to identify Datastream securities for which the underlying 
asset is not common equity. The search is carried out in the data type and in company name. 
 
 
 
